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THE SPANISH LAKE

From the early sixteenth century Spain attempted to comprehend within its vast circle of "closed seas" the entire area of the Pacific. The antipodal extension of the papal line of demarcation gave a certain sanction to the claim from its very inception.¹ However, the admonitory efficacy of this ban was largely nullified by the early apostatizing of the maritime powers most likely to challenge such an assumption,² and by the refusal of France to accept its principle as binding.³ This rather unsubstantial claim Spain fortified with the right of discovery. Núñez de Balboa declared the sea, and its islands and contiguous territories the property of the Castilian crown, while the work of Magellan and of Cortes further strengthened the hold of Spain upon the South Sea. To bolster up its inordinate assertion of ownership Spain also invoked the old theory of the *mare clausum*, which was here applied to an unprecedented area of water.⁴

¹ Bourne, "The History and Determination of the Line of Demarcation established by Pope Alexander VI, between the Spanish and Portuguese Fields of Discovery and Colonization", in *Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the year 1891* (Washington, 1892); Harriette, *The Diplomatic History of America* (London, 1897); Van der Linden, "Alexander VI. and the Demarcation of the Maritime and Colonial Domains of Spain and Portugal, 1493-1494", in *The American Historical Review*, XXII. (1916).

² "The authority of the Pope has absolutely no force against the eternal law of nature and of nations." Grotius, *The Freedom of the Seas, or the Right which belongs to the Dutch to take part in the East Indian Trade* (1608), edition of 1916, p. 66.

³ "Les Français contestèrent la validité de cet acte. L'ambassadeur de France fut enjoint à faire observer sur ce sujet que ni le roi de France ni aucun prince d'Europe n'a jamais prétendu être retenu par la considération de la ligne de demarcation que les Espagnols citent comme un titre incontestable, la décision du pape à cet égard n'étant que entre le roi d'Espagne et le roi de Portugal." (Pontchartrain to the Comte de Marcin, November 2, 1701), quoted by Dahlgren, *Les relations commerciales et maritimes entre la France et les côtes de l'océan Pacifique* (1909), p. 272.

⁴ "Selon les idées de l'Espagne, la mer du Sud était toujours une mer fermée, un *mare clausum* au sens le plus étroit du mot." *Ibid.*, p. 239. The Spaniard Viana in contesting the force of the Dutch claim to exclusive navigation in the seas to

So far as its resources permitted, Spain relied on actual priority of occupation. However, its population and wealth, and the initiative of its rulers during the seventeenth century, were not commensurate with the work of exploration, conquest, and settlement that would have been required for the proper enforcement of its monopoly. And gigantic a scheme as it was, the domination of the Pacific was, after all, a secondary phase of Spanish world imperialism. It was always subordinated to the *Indias Occidentales*, or Western Indies—that is, to America. For the latter produced the resources for the furtherance of the quixotic ambitions of the crown in Europe, whereas the empire of the Pacific was, if not a distinct liability, at least non-contributory to the general coffers of the monarchy. Of course, exception must here be made of the settled western littoral of America, especially of Peru.

As to the actual extent of Spanish occupancy—by 1542 Spain held, or claimed, on the basis of discoveries like those of Cabrillo-Ferrelo—the whole eastern shore of the Pacific from the region of Cape Mendocino to that of Cape Horn. The southern entrance at the Straits of Magellan it later guarded with an occasional fleet, when there was danger of an invader, and for a time after the shock of Drake's incursion by Sarmiento's ill-fated

the southwest of the Philippines, and on as far as the Cape, later declared the *mare clausum* theory only a valid authorization of monopoly in such restricted areas as in the case of the Venetian control of the Adriatic. The seas, the recognition of whose ownership was coveted by the Dutch, he declared that “por su inmensidad no admiten el particular uso de una sola Potencia, contra el derecho de los demas”. *Demonstracion del misero deplorable estado de las Islas Philipinas*, 1765, book II. ch. 2, sect. 10. Grotius had in fact written his famous *Liberum Mare* to combat the very claims which the Dutch themselves made after they had broken down the Portuguese monopoly of the Cape route. *Op. cit.* Grotius quoted against the pretensions of Spain the words of the Spanish juriscounsel, Fernando Vázquez, to the effect that “places public and common to all by the law of nations cannot become objects of prescription”. *Ibid.*, p. 52. As to the applicability of the *mare clausum* formula to so great an area, the Englishman, Selden, who argued against “a natural and perpetual communitie of the sea”, said: “that which is objected, touching the vast magnitude of the Sea, and its inexhaustible abundance, is of very little weight here”. *Mare Clausum; the Right and Dominion of the Sea*, edition of 1663, p. 141. See Vattel, *The Law of Nations*, edition of 1861, p. 125, for his denial of the *mare clausum* dogma.

colony.⁵ To the far northward the only menace lay in the problematical existence of *Anian*, the mythical strait that was believed to connect the two oceans.⁶ The possible discovery of this "northwest passage" by some foreign power seriously concerned the Spanish proprietors of the Pacific almost till the end of the colonial régime. On the opposite side the Russians had not yet crossed Siberia and broken out onto the forbidden sea. It was well along in the eighteenth century when they pushed their claims—and activities—down to the California coasts.⁷

The great semi-circle of islands that stretches from Kamchatka around until it disappears south of the equator among the myriad islets of Polynesia—this was to form the western barrier of the Spanish Pacific. As for Japan, militant and proud under Hideyoshi and the great Takugawa shoguns, nothing more than a spiritual conquest could be hoped for. However, the aggressive national spirit, embodied in the samurai's ideal of *bushido*, might be neutralized by the astute Jesuit propaganda of pacifism, the very issue which the Japanese foresaw and so ruthlessly forestalled.⁸ The Spaniards also feared the Japanese ambitions for maritime expansion, and accordingly schemed to keep them a strictly insular people. It was with this purpose that they refused to further the desire of the Japanese to develop ship-building. China, too, came into the scope of the Spanish plan, and several projects were made for its conquest.⁹ In view of the habitually pacific and inoffensive attitude of China, cherishing its traditional isolation, there was at least little positive danger from that direction. Formosa was for a

⁵ Markham, *Narratives of the Voyages of Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa to the Straits of Magellan*, in *Hakluyt Society Publications*, vol. 91.

⁶ There is no satisfactory work on the subject of *Anian*. See, however, Bancroft, *History of the Northwest Coast*, I. ch. 2.

⁷ See Golder, *Russian Expansion on the Pacific 1641-1850* (Cleveland, 1914).

⁸ The best exposition of this phase of the Jesuit movement in Japan is found in the chapter entitled, "The Jesuit Peril", in Lafcadio Hearn's *Japan—An Attempt at Interpretation* (New York, 1904).

⁹ Sanz Arismendi, "Un capítulo para la historia de Felipe II (relaciones entre España y China)", in *Congreso de historia y geografía hispano-americanas* (Madrid, 1914).

time a possession of Spain, while Indo-China was the object of the designs of Gomez Perez Dasmariñas and his son Luis. The Philippines constituted the very key to the whole Asiatic line of Pacific defense. The Moluccas were Spanish for a few decades, and Spain maintained its hold on Ternate of this group until 1663. The King of Borneo gave his dominions in vassalage to Governor Sande, and New Guinea had been claimed for Spain from very early by right of discovery. Finally, at the lower rim of the great arc the discoveries of Mendaña and Quiros secured for Spain some of the groups that extend south-eastward from New Guinea. Such was the achievement and the dream of Spanish imperialism in the Pacific. That the whole conception of "the Spanish Lake" was not a mere quixotic vagary of a people given to grandiose visions its approximate realization in the early seventeenth century abundantly proved. It only failed of reaching its entirety because Sarmiento and Quiros, Monterey and Vizcaino, Acuña and Silva were greater than the government they served. As it was, in its essentials it actually was for two centuries a realized fact.¹⁰ Well might Grotius exclaim: "Shall the people of Spain, forsooth, assume a monopoly of all the world?"¹¹

To the rear of the inner archipelago the Portuguese possessions served as a secondary line of defense for the Spanish control of the Pacific. The absorption of Portugal in 1580 was evidently aimed to secure ultimately the disposal of its East Indian resources, just as Louis XIV's designs on Spain had in view the utilization of the wealth of the Spanish Indies. Thus, until the separation in 1640 Portuguese policy in its larger phases was subordinated to that of Spain. Under this régime Macao became a part of the Spanish scheme of defense,¹² as did the vitally

¹⁰ Morse Stephens, "The Conflict of European Nations in the Pacific Ocean", in Stephens and Bolton, *The Pacific Ocean in History* (1916), p. 23; Altamira, "The Share of Spain in the History of the Pacific Ocean", *ibid.*, pp. 34-54, and Spanish original, pp. 55-75.

¹¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 71.

¹² The governor of the Philippines was ordered by the king to send aid to Macao in case of need. Grau y Monfalcón, "Memorial informatorio", in *Extracto historial*, f. 234. Even after the forcible dissolution of the "union", the virtual

important Malacca, which the great Albuquerque had occupied in 1511,¹³ and for a briefer period the Javas as well. Behind these were Ceylon, the posts on the Indian peninsula—Goa, Cochin, and the rest, the Cape of Good Hope, and the Guinea way-stations.¹⁴

On the eastern side of the Americas a like function was performed by the Spanish colonies in the Caribbean area and on the Plata, since a force must pass these outworks before it could enter the open Pacific. It was due to the weakness of the precautions taken at the isthmus, which was one of the two strategical points in the line, that the buccaneers were able to break out upon the South Sea in the latter eighteenth century. The Castle of Chagre, which Morgan's men stormed in 1680, was part of the defenses of the Spanish empire of the Pacific. The importance of the Falkland Islands, over which a serious controversy arose in the latter eighteenth century, lay in their position as commanding the entrance to the Straits of Magellan and the route around Cape Horn. Brazil was also as necessary to the consummation of the Spanish scheme on this side as was Malacca on the other, a circumstance which explains the anxiety of Spain at the Dutch occupation of the Pernambuco-Bahia district of the Portuguese colony in the seventeenth century.

Over the whole vast area Spain spread its formal prohibition of foreigners. "No foreign ships shall pass to the Indies, and such as do, shall be seized," runs a law of 1540, which was repeated in 1558, 1559, 1560, and 1563.¹⁵ The ruthless harrying of here-

identity of Spanish and Portuguese interests persisted in the face of foreign aggressions, and in 1641 Governor Corcuera sent reinforcements to help Macao against the Dutch. The King to Viceroy Salvatierra, January, 23, 1648, A. de I., 105-2-2.

¹³ Morse Stephens, *Albuquerque*.

¹⁴ See map entitled "The Age of Discovery, 1340-1600", in Shepherd, *Historical Atlas*, pp. 107-110.

¹⁵ *Leyes de Indias*, lib. 9, tit. 30, ley 22. "Los extrangeros han sido siempre excluidos del comercio de nuestras Indias". Antúñez y Acevedo, *Memorias históricas sobre la legislación, y gobierno del comercio de los españoles con sus colonias en las Indias Occidentales* (Madrid, 1797), p. 268. Veitia Linage calls this policy of exclusivism "a custom common to all nations", (*Norte de la contratación*, p. 236). There is a summary of all this prohibitory legislation in the

tics by the Inquisition,¹⁶ and a system of espionage in London, Amsterdam, and other cities, to learn of the movements of prospective expeditions to the Pacific, were intended to aid the fleets and forts in maintaining this policy of exclusion.¹⁷ On the "Spanish Lake" thus created the Manila Galleons might sail back and forth with as much security "as though they were on the river of Seville". And Spain meant that the Pacific should be shrouded in such secrecy that the rest of the world could know nothing of these argosies and their tempting cargoes. Thus, Drake was apparently ignorant of their existence until he had left the Pacific.

The Spaniards were favored by the very remoteness of the sea. Only with the utmost risk and difficulty could a ship sail so far without a port available in its path, where it could take on provisions and refit. In this respect Anson's problem in 1740-44 was as serious as Drake's in 1579. Scurvy, starvation, or turning-back were the alternatives that faced the ship without

Archivo Histórico Nacional at Madrid, in legajo no. 2848, entitled: "Extracto circunstanciado y cronológico de las Cédulas Reales, Consultas, ordenes de S.M., y decisiones del Consejo, que hablan de la prohibicion general de navegar navios extrangeros á ntras. Indias, comerciar y establecerse en ellas". Essentially the same document is contained in the Edward E. Ayer Collection in the Newberry Library, Chicago, in a bound MS. volume written by Joseph García de Leon y Pizarro, in conjunction with Fernando Mangino, and entitled: "Compendio Histórico y Cronológico, que demuestra el Descubrimiento del Mar del Sur, y delas Californias, hecho p^r. los Españoles, y asimismo el Fundamento, que asiste á España, para excluir á todas las Naciones de la Navegacion delos Mares de Yndias, y de establecerse, y comerciar en ellas, consentido, y observado p^r. sus Soberanos, y Gobiernos" (Madrid, 1790, 1796).

¹⁶ Lea, *The Inquisition in the Spanish Dependencies*.

¹⁷ In a letter of November 1, 1582, Viceroy Suárez de Mendoza advises the king of information received from Bernardino de Mendoza, the Spanish ambassador in London, regarding two English ships fitting out for a voyage to the Moluccas. A. de I., 58-3-9. In 1776 a resident of London, of Spanish ancestry, named Juan de Guzman y Mendoza, voluntarily sent a warning to a certain high colonial official, apparently the governor of the Philippines, advising him of the approaching departure for the Pacific of Cook's two ships, the *Resolution* and the *Discovery*. He declared that their intention, according to Cook's own confidential avowal to an intimate of both men, was the opening of trade with the west coast of North America, and the occupation of California to compensate England for the anticipated loss of its colonies then in rebellion. The letter is written in French, and dated February 15, 1776, A. de I., 105-4-5.

a port-of-call. Until after 1600 all such way-stations on the road to the Pacific, whether on the *camino de Indias* around the Cape of Good Hope, or on Magellan's old path around South America, were in Spanish or Portuguese hands. Except for the period of Dutch occupation in Brazil and the duration of Villegagnon's Huguenot settlements about Rio Bay, this condition remained true of the westward route into the South Sea until the end of the colonial regime of Spain and Portugal in South America. Gradually, the eastward route around Africa became marked with the way-stations of other powers which little heeded the remonstrances of Portugal at the violation of its monopoly. Of these peoples, the English, after their first enterprises among the great archipelago and their conflict with the Dutch, resigned themselves for a long time to the trade with the mainland of India, while the Dutch largely contented themselves with the resources of the East Indies proper. Consequently, the impulse of both to push on into the Pacific was greatly lessened, while the Spaniards steadily held firm in the Philippines against the efforts of the Dutch to break down that western bulwark of Spanish power in the South Sea, and only loosened their hold for a moment when assailed by the English in the latter eighteenth century. For the loss of the Philippines would have uncovered the coasts of America to aggressions from the west, and imperiled the route of the South Sea fleet from the ports of Peru to Panamá.

The hardships of an unbroken voyage into the Pacific made it most difficult to hold a crew together until the attainment of their objects might compensate them for their sufferings, for the long-continued trials were a supreme test of discipline and self-restraint. Even the most masterly leaders had to face discontent or open mutiny. The buccaneers, who entered the Pacific by the easier overland route across the isthmus, quickly fell into anarchy, and were only forced into successful co-operation by their common danger or lust for booty, save when they were dominated by some more ferocious will.

Although Spain secured the virtual incorporation of its pretensions in the Treaties of Westphalia, its strength was not in

reality proportionate to the task of maintaining such a colossal assumption the moment it should be seriously challenged by another power. During the age of Elizabeth and Philip II. the balance of naval strength shifted to the English and the Dutch. The old formulae of the papal demarcation and the *mare clausum* could henceforth have little force against interloping peoples who were "Lutherans" and who only respected such theories of possession as served their own ambitions for dominion and trade. In the face of this condition Spain could not adequately police the Pacific, and it left unprotected the three groups of islands that were so vital to the hostile armaments, once they had penetrated into the Pacific—Juan Fernandez, the turtle breeding Galápagos, and the Ladrones, where passing ships could always obtain provisions by one means or another from the small Spanish population on Guam.

The Spaniards did all possible to discourage trading across the Pacific to New Spain or Peru, for this would not only imperil Spanish shipping and compete with Spanish merchants in the colonial markets, but would constitute a serious political menace by the possible founding of establishments on the American coasts. They were as anxious to forbid trans-Pacific navigation to Orientals as to Europeans. A memorial drawn up in 1586 by the leading citizens of Manila declared among the advantages to be derived from the proposed conquest of China the prohibition of Chinese voyages to New Spain and Peru.¹⁸ Nor was a Japanese voyage to Acapulco in the early part of the next century permitted to become a precedent. Before this—in 1590—a Portuguese merchant of Macao, Dom João da Gama, crossed to the Mexican coast with a large cargo to trade.¹⁹ However, in spite of the fact that Portugal and Spain were then "united", da Gama's goods were confiscated, and he himself was sent to Seville to be tried by the *audiencia* of the *Casa de Contratacion*. Governor Gomez Perez Dasmariñas protested to the king that such a direct trade between China and America

¹⁸ Santiago de Vera and others to the Council of the Indies, July 26, 1586, Blair and Robertson, *The Philippine Islands*, VI. 226.

¹⁹ Viceroy Velasco to the King, July 28, 1591, A. de I., 58-3-11.

would be disastrous to the commercial interests of Manila.²⁰ Indeed, the enterprise of Dom João was no more welcome to Spain than had been that of Dom Vasco a century before.

More serious in its possible consequences was the trading voyage made by some Dutch and English ships to the Mexican coast in 1746.²¹ This voyage had been preceded two years earlier by an attempt of the Dutch authorities on Java to secure the privilege of trading at Manila.²² Denied the concession, they determined to open a direct trade from the orient with the Spanish American coasts, a traffic which would have offered the most serious competition to the Manila Galleon.²³ In order to insure a profitable market for the expedition, by preventing the departure of the year's *nao* from Manila, the Dutch governor at Batavia resorted to the ruse of warning the Spaniards of an intended attack by a British fleet under Admiral Barnet, then cruising in the East Indies.²⁴ Meanwhile four Dutch and two English ships cleared for the American coast with rich cargoes of oriental goods and an authorization to offer the viceroy of New Spain a large bribe for the right to trade with that region.²⁵ The two Dutch ships, which continued across the Pacific after the fleet had been dispersed by storms, disposed of their goods on the Guadalajara coast before the official prohibitions from Mexico could reach the authorities of those districts.²⁶ They penetrated the Gulf of California as far as Guaymas, and while reconnoitering the lower coast one of them sighted two Philippine galleons in the harbor of Acapulco. However, the

²⁰ Dasmariñas to the King, May 31, 1592, A. de I., 67-6-2.

²¹ Pedro Calderón Henríquez to the President of the Council of the Indies, July 16, 1746, B. and R., XLVII. 240. The Spanish documentary material on this subject is contained in legajo 68-6-27, A. de I., entitled: "Expediente sobre los dos navíos holandeses que desde Batavia fueron á comerciar á la Nueva España".

²² Marqués del Puerto to the Dutch States-General, April 28, 1750, *ibid.* The Marqués del Puerto was the Spanish envoy sent to the United Provinces to protest against what Spain alleged to be violations of articles 5 and 6 of the Treaty of Munster, and, more especially, of articles 31 and 34 of the Treaty of Utrecht.

²³ Marqués del Puerto to the States-General, April 5, 1747, *ibid.*

²⁴ Carvajal y Lancaster to the King, September 8, 1747, *ibid.*

²⁵ The incumbency of the viceregal office by the Conde de Revillagigedo insured the failure of any attempt to corrupt the central government at Mexico.

²⁶ Revillagigedo to Ensenada, April 30, 1747, *ibid.*

Dutch do not seem to have repeated this attempt to trade with the west coast of New Spain.

The régime of exclusion was already drawing to a close, and it was only a few decades before the Russians began their voyages from Alaska down the California shore. Maritime ethics and customs were changing,²⁷ and the great pretension of Spain to the monopoly of the Pacific had been unmasked. Whatever remained of the old idea of the "Spanish lake" was dispelled by Anson, and the *Covadonga* was Spain's sacrifice to the inutility of a colossal presumption, which could not survive the broadsides of a single English frigate. The pernicious doctrine that one nation might dominate such an expanse of sea gave way before the rise of more liberal ideas on maritime rights, as well as before a display of naval force. In this regard Cook and his compeers did in the Pacific the work that Voltaire and the other French philosophers did in Europe. The advance up the coast to Alaska, attended with so much of the old heroism,²⁸ and the stand made at Nootka²⁹ were the final efforts of Spain in the

²⁷ Of course, the Polish adventurer, Benyowsky, who approached the route of the galleon from the north west, was, according to any code, an outlaw of the sea. Though he would have found in the galleon an alluring objective for his wild cruise, he was apparently ignorant of its existence. Among the extensive Benyowsky literature, see especially *Memorials and Travels of Mauritius Augustus Count de Benyowsky*, with an introduction, notes and bibliography by Captain S. Pasfield Oliver (London, 1904). There is some new material on the subject in "Expediente sobre varias actividades de Húngaros y Rusos en el Norte del Pacífico", A. de I., 107-1-18.

²⁸ The best summary of these voyages is given by Navarrete in *Expediciones en busca del paso del noroeste de la América* (Madrid, 1802), published as an introduction to the diary of the voyage made by the ships *Sutil* and *Mejicana*. "Una política prudente y sabio", said Navarrete, "dictó y dirigió estas empresas no solo por la conveniencia de nuestra continua navegación y tráfico con las Filipinas, sino porque sabiendo que los Rusos extendían sus establecimientos por toda aquella costa, no podía el gobierno desentenderse de la seguridad de sus colonias establecidas en ella, ni de sus preferentes derechos á tan dilatados países". *Ibid.*, p. CXXLI. A translation of this work by Dr. Herbert I. Priestley, Assistant Curator of the Bancroft Library, of the University of California, is to appear in the *Publications of the Academy of Pacific Coast History*. For later accounts of the voyages see: Bancroft, *History of the Northwest Coast*, I.; Heawood, *A History of Geographical Discovery in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*.

²⁹ Manning, *The Nootka Sound Controversy*, Washington, 1904.

days of its belated revival to uphold what seemed tenable of its long-cherished dream.

From early times foreign navigators of various stamps had entered the Pacific in defiance of Spanish prohibitions. They were all bent on prey—all raiders of different categories of legality—whether privateers like Anson, buccaneers like Bartholomew Sharp, or great mariners like Drake, who had a doubtful authorization to plunder and to the Spaniards was as truly a “pirata” as was Coignet or Lionel Wafer. After the middle of the eighteenth century foreigners sailed about the Pacific at will, and they were men of a new stamp. Scientific explorers of the type of Cook and Vancouver, Bougainville, and La Prouse, could scarcely be classed with those outlaws from humanity who scourged the eastern edge of the Pacific in the later seventeenth century.

In the first years of the line no provision was made for the protection of the galleons beyond placing small arms in the hands of those on board. It was with such an armament that the *Santa Ana* tried to stand off Cavendish’s Englishmen in 1587. However, the shock caused by the incursions of Drake and Cavendish led to the adoption of more serious measures of defense. The report of Governor Vera to Philip II. in 1588 is indicative of the change already produced by the loss of the *Santa Ana*. “The ships are well supplied with artillery”, he said. “All the passengers have arquebuses, swords, and bucklers; the seamen carry at least a sword, and each ship is armed with pikes, partisans, large stores of powder and munitions, bombs and grenades.” A law of 1601, designed to prevent the practice of equipping the fortifications with artillery taken from the galleon, forbade the removal at Manila of guns mounted on the *nao* at Acapulco.³⁰ A decree of three years later required that each piece in the galleon’s battery should have a trained gunner.³¹ A more general law of 1608 compelled the governor of the Philippines to see that the *naos* were provided “with

³⁰ *Leyes, lib. 9, tit. 45, ley 23.*

³¹ *Ibid., ley 21.* A law of 1624 assured to the gunners of the Manila Galleon the same privileges as were enjoyed by those in the *carrera de Indias*. *Ibid., ley 22.*

the arms necessary for their defense, and that soldiers, crew, and passengers were well armed".³² The ordinances of Governors Valdés and Arandia were more detailed in their provisions for keeping the galleons in an adequate state of defense.

However, in spite of the excellent cannon cast at Cavite, across from Manila, the galleons seldom sailed with a sufficient equipment of guns. For the sake of the additional lading space which the omission of the guns would permit those in charge were willing to risk the chances of attack. Whatever guns were carried were often stowed away in the hold, while the decks were piled high with bales and chests of merchandise. In case of a sudden attack under such circumstances as occurred with the *Santissima Trinidad*, a sixty gun ship that fought with but ten in position, the result for the galleon was calamitous. On the outward passage from Acapulco greater precautions were usually taken to prepare for emergencies. At this time the ship had also the advantage of the small arms of the re-enforcements on the way out to the islands.³³ Moreover, space was not then at such a premium for the accomodation of cargo, and the guns could be put into place without discommoding the mercantile interests in the galleon.

Convoys were seldom resorted to, unless the danger to the galleon was quite imminent.³⁴ Such a regular system of con-

³² *Ibid.*, ley 20.

³³ A cedula of December 31, 1604, ordered each galleon to carry fifty soldiers from Acapulco to Manila. Serving as marines, they were not only bound to defend the *nao* in case of need, but were sometimes added to the garrison at Manila, instead of accompanying the galleon on its return voyage. This precaution was neglected the moment the course was believed to be free from enemies. The King to Governor Silva, November 6, 1607, A. de I., 105-2-12. In 1753 the City of Manila complained of the governor's regulation for placing sixty-six marines on the galleon. They alleged that they were utterly unfit, and that they deserted at the first opportunity. City and Commerce to the King, July 18, 1753, A. de I., 68-6-50. The passengers were always expected to take part in the defense of the ship. Thus, Gemelli Careri's entry for Christmas Day, 1696, reads: "All persons had Muskets given them, to defend ourselves against Enémies that are often met with on the Coast of California". Churchill, *Voyages*, IV. 495.

³⁴ Miss Catherine Coman wrongly says: "Every Manila galleon must needs be attended by an armed frigate, a system of defence whose cost eventually ruined the Philippine trade" (*Economic Beginnings of the Far West*, I. 118). Savary de

voys, for example, as was employed in the navigation to Portobelo,³⁵ was never adopted, nor was anything like the *armada de Barlovento*, or Windward Fleet,³⁶ maintained. Save for the time of the Dutch wars, and that of the buccaneer-privateer inroads into the Pacific in the later seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the menace was not chronic, as it was for long periods in the West Indies. Armed vessels were, however, occasionally sent up the coast of New Spain to escort the galleon past the dangerous tip of California and on into Acapulco harbor.³⁷ The governor of the Philippines likewise frequently despatched ships from Manila to meet the galleons from New Spain outside the islands, and accompany them through the straits and up to their anchorage before Cavite.³⁸ Sometimes advice-boats—usually small galleys or *pataches*—were sent out to warn the *nao* of enemies, and order it to change its course; or the galleon might carry orders from the viceroy to the same effect. In this case it generally followed the route around the north of Luzon, or put in at one of the bays on the east coast,

Bruslons made the same error: "On leur donne pour convoi une frégate de 28 canons" (*Dictionnaire de commerce*, IV. 1429). The burden of the *avería*, or convoy tax, was very severe in the case of the *flota-galeones* trade, but the Manila-Acapulco line was exempt from this imposition, except in extraordinary emergencies.

³⁵ *Leyes*, lib. 9, tits. 29, 36, *passim*.

³⁶ Veitia Linage, *Norte de la contratacion*, lib. 2, cap. 5.

³⁷ Churchill, *op. cit.*, p. 498. Casanate and Otondo, two men prominent in the history of Lower California, were charged with this duty in 1648 and 1685 respectively. Venegas, I. 193, 211. The famous Jesuit, Padre Kino, who accompanied Otondo on the latter occasion, describes the event in his *Favores celestiales*, lib. VIII., cap. 2.

On the appearance of foreign ships off the South American coast the alarm was spread to the northward as far as the district of the *Audiencia* of Guadalajara, whose jurisdiction included Lower California. Thus, in 1709, the viceroy ordered the latter authorities to find some means of warning the galleon of the proximity of English ships which had sacked Guayaquil, and were proceeding northward. Albuquerque to the King, October 31, 1709, A. de I., 61-1-30.

³⁸ Richard Cocks heard in Japan in July, 1615 that "Don Jno. de Silva was gon to keepe the straites with a gale and a phriggat, attending the coming of shipping from Agua Pulca" (*Diary*, I. 24). In 1686, when fears were entertained for the safety of the *San Telmo*, the governor armed the *Santo Niño* with over 100 cannon and 1,000 men, and sent it to the Embocadero to convoy the Acapulco ship to Cavite (Díaz, *Conquistas*, p. 784).

as Albay, where it could place its silver in safety.³⁹ A system of fire signals was also devised by the Jesuit, Francisco Colín, with the aid of which galleons were warned by fires built on outlying prominences of the eastern coasts.⁴⁰ A code was developed by varying the number of fires or the frequency of the puffs of smoke, in such a way as to indicate the course to be followed, or the strength and location of the enemy. Recourse was had to some such expedient on the American side, where signals were made from the Island of Cedros, which was usually the first landfall of the galleons, and also from salient points on the mainland coast. After the founding of the missions on the peninsula the Jesuits in charge were expected to advise the *naos* that put in there of any strange sail observed off that quarter of the coast.⁴¹

WILLIAM LYTLE SCHURZ

³⁹ Colín, *Labor evangélica*, I. 223.

⁴⁰ Murillo Velarde, *Historia*, f. 126b. This Colín was the author of the *Labor evangélica* just quoted.

⁴¹ The above is a chapter from Dr. Schurz's doctoral dissertation *The Manila Galleon*, which is still unpublished in its entirety.